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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses farmers’ decisions on land allocation between the major cereals in India’s 
most agriculturally advanced state—Punjab. A mean-variance model of optimal land allocation, 
in which farmers are postulated to be risk averse, maximising expected utility from value added 
from growing cereals, perceiving the deviation of the farm-gate prices from the government 
guaranteed prices in accordance with an autoregressive process, and expecting yields’ means 
and variances to be proportional to the area under cultivation, is developed and estimated with 
panel data. Estimates of farm-land allocations determinants are obtained under a wide range of 
alternative assumptions about the expectation-formation mechanism and the issue of ‘money 
illusion’.
* The authors are members of the Department of Economics, University of W ollongong, New South Wales, 
Australia. They are grateful to Ms, M ei Ball for com petent research assistance and to Ms Sofia 
Abercrombie and Ms Julie Chin for patiently typing semi-legible drafts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In many developing countries, and in India in particular, the green revolution which 
started in the 1960s has advanced the agricultural technology through the introduction of new 
irrigation methods, machinery, improved hybrids, fertilisers, herbicides, pesticides, and the 
like. In addition, the green revolution probably has been expressed through improved methods 
of managing the individual agrobusiness.1 Farming, perhaps more than any other industry, is 
vulnerable to uncertainty about yields and input and output prices resulting in extensive policy 
interventions. Since the early 1950s there have been important developments in economic 
theory with regard to the implication of uncertainty on the choice of the activity set in 
production, investment and consumption. One of the most appealing method of determining the 
optimal choice of activities is derived from Markowitz’s (1952) mean-variance portfolio 
selection model which stresses the desirability of diversification of the individual’s asset 
holdings in order to moderate the costs of risk bearing and to achieve maximum expected utility 
from the proceeds of these assets. The application of the mean-variance approach in agricultural 
economics is discussed by Berck (1981), Yassour, Zilberman and Rausser (1981), Levy
(1982), Just and Zilberman (1983, 1988), Collender and Zilberman (1985), Antle (1989), 
Levy, Justman and Hochman (1989) and others.
This paper investigates whether these conceptual developments in decision making 
under uncertainty have been incorporated by the participants of the green revolution as 
experienced in one of the most agriculturally advanced state of India—the Punjab. In particular, 
the responses of farmers decision on land allocation in Punjab between major cereals—wheat 
and gram in winter and rice and maize in summer—to input and output price expectations and to 
variations in yields during the period of years 1966-1987 are compared to those advocated by 
the mean-variance portfolio selection model. Estimates of the determinants of the land allocated 
for growing these cereals are essential for evaluating food supply stabilisation programmes.
Punjab has been the epicenter of the green revolution in Asia. Consequently, the 
experience of this state in the context of the green revolution has wider interest. Punjab has 
emerged from a food deficit state with stagnant agriculture during the first half of the century 
(1906-1946) into granary of India within a span of four decades. Since the advent of the green 
revolution during mid-1960s the rate of growth of foodgrains output in Punjab has been
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running at almost two and a half times that of the rest of India. Per capita output of food is four 
times higher in Punjab than the all-India average. Eighty four per cent of the geographical area 
of the state is under crop production. Almost all of it is high yielding hybrid varieties. Over 
ninety-one per cent of the gross cropped area is irrigated. Rice and wheat are produced on 
entirely irrigated lands. Fertiliser use per hectare is around one hundred and fifty seven 
kilogram, which is four and half times the national average.
Punjab has three distinct agroclimatic sub-zones. The foothills of the Shiwaliks in the 
Himalayas in the north, and the areas bordering the Thai desert in the south are two sub-zones 
which do not have ideal conditions for the production of hybrid wheat and rice varieties. The 
middle sub-zone covering seven districts consists of plains with fresh and potable underground 
water with high tube well irrigation potential. These seven districts are Amritsar, Jullundhar, 
Ludhiana, Patiala, Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala and Sangrur. The entire middle sub-zone has similar 
annual rainfall levels (averaging six hundred and fifty millimeters), soil texture, micro­
nutrients, climate and crop husbandry practices. These reasons induced us to restrict our 
analysis to the seven aforementioned districts of the homogeneous agro-climatic middle sub­
zone. These districts also have well developed rural infrastructure: all villages have access to 
electricity, all-weather roads, regulated grain markets and efficient input supply.2
Table 1 below reveals that between 1953 and 1986 the per hectare yield of wheat and 
rice was rising at unprecedented rates. In contrast, the rate of growth of the per hectare yield of 
maize was substantially smaller, and the per hectare yield of gram was stagnant, with high 
variability, during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and significantly declined during the 1980s. 
Table 1 reveals further that these trends in per hectare yield of cereals were accompanied by a 
dramatic shift in land allocation in Punjab in favour of wheat as the major winter crop followed 
by rice as the major summer crop. This development in per hectare yield and cropping pattern 
might indicate the important role of trends and variations in yield per hectare in determining the 
farm-land allocation in Punjab.
3




Rice Maize Wheat Gram
Yield per Hectare (Kilograms)
1953-1956 892 1300 901 800
1963-1966 1223 1265 1510 760
1973-1976 2823 1550 2797 820
1983-1986 3094 1910 3289 580
Area (thousands o f hectares)
1953-1956 210.3 390.0 1624.3 1262.7
1963-1966 306.3 548.0 2059.3 493.0
1973-1976 1255.3 836.0 5418.3 302.3
1983-1986 5024.3 509.3 10195.3 69.7
Source: Chaudhri, Singh, Deb and Piraziziy (1991)
Since 1986 the government of India has followed a floor-price system mainly for wheat 
and rice. In view of policy-makers’ interest, a large number of empirical studies on Punjab 
agriculture attempting to estimate acreage and output price elasticities have been reported in the 
economic literature within India and internationally. Most of these studies have dealt with wheat 
and have had varied coverage of districts, periods, model specifications, estimation procedures 
which have led to widely divergent results. Krishna (1963), using partial adjustment model 
with naive price expectation reported wheat acreage elasticity of 0.14 for greater Punjab during 
the period 1914-43. Krishna and Raychaudhuri (1980) found wheat acreage elasticity of 0.276 
for the period 1957-69. Cummings (1975) obtained an estimate for Punjab wheat-acreage’s 
elasticity of 0.13 with 1950-67 data. Kaul (1967) reported an elasticity of 0.12 for five districts 
in Punjab, and Kaul and Sidhu (1971) found an elasticity of 0.15 for Punjab as a whole. These 
results are representative of over 45 studies with wheat acreage elasticity estimates ranging 
between 0.004 and 0.37 depending on the period, coverage and estimation procedure.3
The historical addivity of acreage and yield elasticities to output elasticity does not hold 
for recent years. The summation of acreage and yield elasticities has diverged from the directly
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estimated output elasticity for recent data as reported by Krishna and Chibber (1983), Ray
(1983) and Ray and Subramanian (1983). One major reason for these divergences might be the 
exclusion of the uncertainty about yields and the associated costs of risk bearing with respect to 
prices and outputs. These issues have not been explored in the context of agriculture in India.
This paper analyses the land allocation between the major cereals in Punjab within a 
mean-variance model of optimal land allocation in which farmers are postulated to be risk 
averse, maximising expected utility from value added from growing cereals, perceiving the 
deviation of the farm-gate prices from the government guaranteed prices in accordance with an 
autoregressive process, and expecting yields’ means and variances to be proportional to the 
land under the various cereals. The mean-variance model and the properties of the derived 
optimal land allocation are presented in section 2. The procedure and data for estimating the 
determinants of the optimal land allocation are described in section 3. The estimation results, 
under alternative assumptions about the expectation formation mechanism and the issue of 
‘money illusion’, are displayed and interpreted in section 4. Concluding remarks and policy 
implications are given in section 5.
2 MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL LAND ALLOCATION
The mean-variance portfolio approach to land allocation is based on the assumption that 
there is uncertainty about prices and yields and that farmers are risk averse and allocate land to 
the various crops so as to maximise the expected utility from the proceeds from these activities. 
As indicated in the introduction, a wide range of mean-variance models of land allocation have 
been developed and recorded in the agricultural economics literature. In order to motivate the 
subsequent empirical analysis, this section presents the conceptual specifications that are likely 
to be suitable for the Punjabi case and that underlie our land-allocation regression equations. In 
view of the price stabilisation policy practiced by the Indian government, our analysis 
incorporates the assumption that farmers perception of the current market price deviation from 
the guaranteed price follows a deterministic autoregressive process such as the naive or adaptive 
expectations’ mechanisms. Thus, it is the probability distribution of yields that underlies the 
mean-variance portfolio model of farm land allocation constructed below.
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Let Lk be the number of hectares allocated to growing crop k and ?k(Lk) the
corresponding production function of crop k. The determination of the farm land allocated to 
growing crop k takes into account random disturbances in production. These disturbances are 
assumed to be proportional to the scale of operation— the land allocated to the k-th activity. 
Hence,
for every k = 1 ,2 , ..., K. Here, fk is a non-decreasing function of Lk, and £k is a random
effect of the uncontrolled physical conditions on the yield of crop k. It is assumed that £k is
2 grown simultaneously is exposed to common uncontrolled growing conditions, the 
covariance of ek and e.g (Oki) is not necessarily equal to zero. It is positive (negative) when 
these crops have similar (opposite) responses to uncontrolled growing conditions.
The determination of the land allocation on the farm is also based on the following 
assumptions:
(i) The production costs of crop k are proportional to the land allocated to growing this 
crop. That is
where we is a vector of the expected prices of all the other inputs involved in the production of 
crop k, and Ck is the associated cost function per hectare.
(ii) Farmers are price takers in both the markets of outputs and inputs. They face 
govemmentally guaranteed prices for their produce (Pf) and form their expectations about the
deviation of the farm-gate price (Pk) from the guaranteed price in accordance with Cagan’s
(1956) adaptive expectation model. Thus, the k-th crop market price perceived by the farmers 
(P |) is found from:
?k((Lk) = fk(Lk) + Lk Ek ( 1 )
variable indicating the fluctuations in the per hectare yield of crop k comprising the marginal
normally distributed with mean zero and variance o^. Moreover, since any pair of crops k and
Ck = ck(we)Lk (2)
j=0
OO P(Pk t - l - Pf  t-1 )
1 - (1 - P ) £
(3)
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where £ denotes the lag operator, and 0 < (3 < 1 the expectation-correction coefficient.
adaptive expectation hypothesis and hence can be expressed as:
where wj, t-i is the last season’s price of the i-th input.
(iii) The farmers level of satisfaction from the value added generated on the farm (Y) can be 
found from the negative exponential utility function which reflects constant absolute degree of 
risk aversion (R):
Assuming that farmers are expected utility maximisers and in recalling the 
abovementioned assumptions, the farmers’ decision problem can be expressed as
max E [u(Y)]
{Li, ..., Lk}
subject to the value-added constraint
Similarly, the price of the i-th production input perceived by the farmers (w?) is based on the
u(Y) = 1 - e-RY . (5)
(6)
and the land constraint
K
I  Lk = 1. (7)
k=l
Since the farm’s total value added (Y) is a linear combination of the normally distributed 
disturbances e i , ..., £k, Y is also normally distributed with mean and variance as given below:
7
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VAR(Y) = I  P jf  o£ + I  I  P® P jL k L^ oki  . 
k=l k=l
(9)
In following Freund (1956), it can be shown that since u is negative exponential and Y 
is normally distributed, E[u(Y)] is equivalent to the moment generating function of the normal
distribution. Hence, maximising E[u(Y)] is equivalent to maximising
1E(Y) - |  R var(Y)
By considering this property and the land constraint the corresponding Lagrangian can be 
expressed as:
K 1 J = I , [P | fk(Lk) - Lkck(we)J - ~ R
K
2 J l
2  P k Lk ° k  + k= l
K K




1 - I  Lk 
k= l
( 10)
While the first term on the right-hand side (r.h.s.) indicates the expected value added, the 
second term indicates the costs of risk bearing stemming from uncertainty about yields, and the 
third term displays the value of unused land on the farm where X is the shadow price of land. 
The necessary conditions for maximum constrained expected utility are:
3J^  = Pek fk (Lk) - c k(we) - R .2 2  - * KP | L k + I  Pek P I  U  OU V  = 0 (11)
for every k = 1, ..., K.
These conditions imply that the farmer’s expected utility is maximised when the allocation of 
land between the K cereals under consideration is such that the increment in the expected 
revenue from an infinitesimal increase in the land allocated to any of them is offset by the 
additional costs of production and risk bearing and the forgone rent on land.
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Our empirical analysis is focused on the two major cereals grown in the Punjab in each 
season—wheat and gram in winter and rice and maize in summer. Therefore, K is set to be 
equal to two hereafter. In order to simply the analysis and to obtain a closed-form solution to 
the optimal land allocation between these cereals it is assumed further that the expected yield of 
each crop is proportional to the land allocated to that crop. That is,
fk(Lk) = yk Lk (12)
for every k = 1, 2 where yk denotes the expected per hectare yield of crop k.
In this case, the set of necessary conditions 11 implies that an interior solution to the land 
allocation problem requires an equality between the marginal contributions of land allocated for 
growing each of the cereals to the farmer’s expected utility:
P i 9 l  - C l(w e) - R p f  L* CTj - R Pe2 a 12 = F | y2 - c2(w<0 - R P* p |  L* o 12 - R p f  l J  a j .  (1 3 )
__  sfc sfc
When the above condition is satisfied, both Lj and L2 are positive. Furthermore, if the land 
constraint is binding, then
(H )
and the amount of land allocated for growing crop 1 is given by
[ P ^  - c i(w e)] - [Pe2 y2 - c2(we)] + R(Pe22 o 2  - Pe! Pe2 a n )
L* = ------------------------ --------------------------------- ------------------------ . (15)
R(P  ̂ o ]  - Pe2 012 + P 2 < * b
It is important to note that in this case the second-order condition for maximum expected utility 
requires that
2 2 
R ( P j - 2 P*j P2 o\2 + P2 a 2 ) > 0 (16)
as long as farmers are risk averse (R > 0).
As can be expected, equations 15 and 16 indicate that the amount of land allocated to 
cereal 1 increases with the expected per hectare profit differential between cereal 1 and cereal 2
9
and decreases with the per hectare yield variance of cereal 1. However, the effects of the 
perceived own-price, cross-price, cross-yields’ variance and yields’ covariance on the amount 
of land allocated for growing cereal 1 are not obvious. These effects are summarised by the 
following propositions. The proofs of these propositions and a detailed derivation of the 
interior solution are provided in the mathematical appendix.
Proposition 1 (The effect of the perceived own-price) 
dh\
---- 1 0 as y |  R[ o f - (2L\ - 1)P| Oi2].
dP\ <  1 <
In accordance with the price expectation’s mechanism specified in equation 3, an increase in the
perceived price of any of the cereals can result from a relatively high realised price in the
previous period and/or an increase in the price guaranteed by the government. Proposition 1
indicates that farmers do not necessarily increase, and might even reduce, the amount of land
allocated for growing cereal 1 when they expect an increase in this cereal market price. The
underlying rationale is that the increase in the costs of risk bearing from increasing the amount
of land under cereal 1 might offset, or even exceed, the expected returns from doing so. The 
greater the per hectare yield’s variation of cereal 1 (Oj) and the smaller the expected per hectare
yield of cereal 1 (yi), the smaller the effect of P® on L^. Moreover, if cereal 1 and 2 have 
different response and resistance to harsh climatic conditions and diseases so that a  12 is small
$
or even negative, and if initially Lj > 0.5, farmers will be more reluctant to increase the amount 
of land under cereal 1 despite the expected increase in this cereal market price.
Proposition 2 (The effect of the perceived cross-price)
3Lj
—  = 0as 2R(P| O2 - P 1 <*i2) (1 • L* ) - y2 = 0.
3P2
A rise in the expected price of cereal 2 increases the expected returns on that crop, but also 
raises the variance of those returns and hence the costs of risk bearing. Thus, a rise in the
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expected price of cereal 2 increases (decreases) the area under cereal 1 if the increase in the 
costs of risk bearing are greater (smaller) than the increase in the expected returns.
Proposition 3 (The effect of the cross-yield variance)
^L*
— ^ 1 0 as [P2 y2 - C2(we)] + R (p f  <s\- V\V*2 a n )  |  [P® y - ci(we)].
This proposition indicates that as long as the land constraint is binding, the area under cereal 1
does not necessarily increase with the level of uncertainty about the per hectare yield of cereal 2. 
It is suggested that an increase in a 2 would most likely increase Li when the growing and
market conditions are less favourable for cereal 1.
Proposition 4 (The effect of the yield’s covariance)
^L*
1 0 as [P\ y x - ci(we) - R p f  c \  ] |  [P | y2 - c2(We) - R p f  oj]
This proposition indicates that if the risk-adjusted marginal expected return on cereal 1 is greater 
(smaller) than that on cereal 2; the larger (smaller) the per hectare yields’ covariance, the larger 
(smaller) the area under cereal 1.
By symmetry, propositions 1 to 4 also describe the properties of the optimal allocation 
of land to cereal 2. However, it might be that under certain circumstances farm-land is fully 
allocated for growing only one of the cereals. In terms of the model, such a corner solution 
evolved when the combination of growing conditions (e.g., land fertility and yield variation) 
and market conditions (e.g., perceived output and input prices) is more favourable for one of 
the crops, irrespective of the scale of operation.
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3 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE AND DATA
For estimating the effects of the determinants of land allocation between the major 
cereals, the first-order Taylor’s approximation of equation 15 is considered:
L it = ao + ai P it + a2 P |t + + a ^  + a5oJt
+ a6o|t + a7 0 i2t + as w®t + a9w |t + Tin (17)
and by symmetry
L2t = bo + bi P^t + b2 P | t + b3yJt + b4y2t + b5o ft
+ b6a | t + b7ai2 t + b8w^t + b9w|t + Ti2t (18)
where w® is the perceived price of fertilisers, w | is the perceived price of herbicides and
pesticides, t is a time index, ao, ..., a9 and bo, ..., bg are scalars and rj i and TJ2 are the 
approximation errors.
It is assumed that the farmers infer the values of y , y , cr2, o |  and a i 2 by calculating
moving averages, variances and covariances with past observed values of the per hectare yields 
yi and y2 over a predetermined period of M growing seasons:
M




a lt = M ^  (yi, t-m - yit)2 (21)
m = l  
1 M
° 2 t  =  M  ^  (y2, t-m - y2 t)2 (22)
m = l
1 M
<*12t = M ^  (yi,t-m -yit)(y2,t-m -y 2t))- (23)
m = l
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The effects of these per hectare yield-distribution’s moments and the perceived output and input 
prices on land allocation between cereal 1 and cereal 2 are indicated by the unknown parameter 
vectors a and b.
Equations 17 and 18 include the perceived prices of the two cereals under consideration 
and the perceived prices of two aggregate agricultural inputs—fertilisers (w®) and pesticides
and herbicides (w|). These perceived output and input prices are assumed to be constructed in
accordance with the adaptive expectations mechanism portrayed by equations 3 and 4, 
respectively. Obviously, the perceived prices cannot be accurately calculated for the sample’s 
early years due to a too short historical time series and hence equations 17 and 18 cannot be 
used for estimating the unknown parameters ao, ..., a9 and bo, ..., t>9 . However, the 
substitution of the aforementioned expectation formation mechanisms into equations 17 and 18, 
and the multiplication of both sides of the resultant equations by [1 - (1 - (3)£] lead to the 
following estimable regression-equation system:
L n  - (1 - P)Li t-l = Pa0 + ai [pPi t-i + (Pft - Pf t.j)] + a2 [PP2 1-1 + (Pft - Pf t.{>]
+ a3 [ y ^  - (1 - p) y : t J] + 04 [y2t - (1 - P) y2 J  + as [ o?t - (1 - P) e?t-i ]
+ 36 [oft - 0  - P) ° 2t-l ] + a7 [Ol2t - (1 - p) 012 t-l] + a8 [p wi t-l] + a9 [p W2 t-l]
+ [Tin - (1 - P) Til t-l] (24)
b2t - (1 - P)L2 t-l = Pbo + bi [pPi t-l + (Pft - Pf t.j)] + b2 [PP2 t-l + (P |t - P | t.j)]
+ b3 [yu - (1 - P) yj t_j] + b4 [y2t - (1 - P) y2 + b5 [o?t - (1 - p) a2lul ]
+ b6 [02t - (! - P) 021-1̂  + b7 t°12t - (1 - P)G12 n ]  + bg tp Wi t-l]
+ b9 [P W2 t-l] + [Tl2t - (1 - P) T]2 t-l]. (25)
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The estimation procedure iterates on the expectation correction coefficient by assigning a 
different value of P in each iteration. In this case, the terms in brackets on the r.h.s. of 
equations 24 and 25 become the regressors explaining the partial adjustment of the land 
allocated for growing the cereals under consideration. The associated parameters ao ,..., a9 and 
bo ,..., t>9 are estimated for ten alternative values of (3 ranging between 0.1 to 1 in intervals of 
0.1. In doing so, a wide range of expectation formation mechanism is explored: when p is set 
to be 1 the parameter vectors a and b are estimated under the naive expectation’s assumption 
that only the last observed price matters; but as P decreases, the weights given to recent 
observations in forming the farmers’ price expectations decline, and when P receives a low 
value these parameter vectors are estimated under the assumption that a relatively small 
adjustment of the price expectations is required since farmers are endowed with almost perfect 
foresight. It is assumed that [t\ it - (1 - P) Tllt-l] and [rj2t -(1 - P) l̂2t - 1] can be regarded as 
error terms having zero means.
The estimation of the land allocation equations are also conducted under two alternative 
assumptions concerning the issue of ‘money illusion’. The first assumption regards the Punjabi 
farmers as immune to ‘money illusion’, and, consequently, estimates of the land allocation 
equations are obtained with the current prices of the various outputs and inputs deflated by the 
Indian wholesale price index with 1970/71 as a base year. In contrast, the second assumption 
regards the Punjabi farmers as suffering from ‘money illusion’, and, hence, the current prices 
of outputs and inputs are considered in the estimation process.
As explained in section 2, the econometric analysis is restricted to the seven districts of 
the homogeneous agroclimatic middle zone of Punjab. Annual observations on area sown (in 
hectares), yields (in kilograms per hectare) ‘farm-gate price’ of outputs (in Indian rupees per 
ton), and govemmentally guaranteed prices (in Indian rupees per ton) for the winter cereals, 
wheat and gram, and the summer cereals, rice and maize, as well as fertilisers price index, 
pesticides and insecticides price index, are collated for these districts for the period of years 
following the initiation of the green revolution: 1961/2-1985/6. These data are extracted from 
various issues of: Area, Production and Yield o f Principle Crops in India, Vol.2, Statistical 
Abstract o f Punjab, and Farm Harvest Prices.
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In recalling the time-series cross-sectional composition of the data base, Kmenta’s 
(1986) cross-sectionally heteroscedastic and timewise autoregressive estimation method is 
applied. It is worth mentioning that similar results are obtained with Zellner’s (1962) estimation 
method of seemingly unrelated regression equations which assumes that there is a 
contemporaneous correlation between the above-mentioned error terms.
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
The estimation results of the land allocation equations 24 and 25 obtained with 
Kmenta’s (1986) estimation method are summarised in Tables B.l to B.4 in Appendix B. 
Tables B.l and B.2 present the estimation results of the land allocation equations for the major 
summer crops rice and maize without and with the assumption that the Punjabi farmers suffer 
from ‘money illusion’, respectively; and, similarly, Tables B.3 and B.4 display the estimation 
results of the land allocation equations for the major winter cereals wheat and gram. The Buse’s 
R-square indicate that in the case of the summer cereals a better fit is obtained under the 
assumption that the Punjabi farmers suffer from ‘money illusion’, but in the case of the winter 
cereals the Buse’s R-squares are not changed substantially by the elimination of the ‘money 
illusion’ assumption. Overall, best estimation results are obtained when the total number of 
lags, M, in the moving averages, variances and covariances of yields is set to be equal to 5; 
and, subsequently, the estimation period is 1966/7-1985/6. Each cell in the tables indicates the 
estimated coefficient, t-ratio and elasticity around the mean. It is important to note that the 
elasticities are computed as the product of the estimated values of ao ,..., a9 and bo ,..., b9 and 
the corresponding ratios of the average value of the independent variable to the average value of 
the dependent variable where the dependent and independent variables are those presented in 
equations 17 and 18. Therefore, the computed elasticities indicate the percentages of change in 
land under each of the pair of cereals under consideration stemming from a one percent increase 
in the perceived prices, per hectare-yield averages, variances and covariance, and input prices. 
It should be mentioned that although there is a certain extent of inaccuracy in the computation of 
the perceived prices for the sample’s early years, this inaccuracy is subsequently moderated by
15
the averaging over a sufficiently long period. The estimation results are discussed and 
interpreted below.
The effect o f the perceived price of rice
Under the assumption that there is no ‘money illusion’ the effects of the perceived price 
of rice on land allocation between rice and maize is statistically insignificant. When it is 
assumed that the Punjabi farmers suffer from ‘money illusion’ the perceived price of rice has a 
statistically positive effect on the land allocated to rice, but statistically insignificant effect on 
land allocated to maize. Nevertheless, the rice-land’s elasticity is small and ranges between 
0.0161 to 0.0480.
The effect o f the perceived price o f maize
Under the assumption that there is no ‘money illusion’ the effect of the perceived price 
of maize on the land allocated to rice is not significantly different from zero. This factor has a 
significantly positive effect on the land allocated to maize only for high values of P and the 
maize-land’s elasticity in these cases ranges between 0.758 and 1.0484. Similar results are 
obtained under the alternative assumption that there is ‘money illusion’, but the maize-land’s 
elasticity is substantially smaller than that obtained under the ‘no-money illusion’ assumption 
and ranges between 0.0102 to 0.0147.
The effect o f the perceived price o f wheat
Under the assumption that there is no ‘money illusion’ the effect of the perceived price 
of wheat on land under wheat is negative and statistically significant for 0.1 < p <0.8, and the 
wheat-land’s elasticity is substantial and ranges between -0.4676 and -1.2042. 
Correspondingly, the effect of the perceived price of wheat on land allocated to gram is 
significantly positive for 0.1 < P < 0.3 with elasticity ranging between 1.2642 and 1.6804, but 
insignificantly different from zero for larger values of p. In view of the necessary condition for 
maximum expected utility (equation 13), propositions 1 and 2 and the data, these results 
indicate, perhaps, that the Punjabi farmers bear a considerable level of risk stemming from the 
uncertainty about the yield of wheat, but moderated by the negative covariance between the per 
hectare yields of wheat and gram. Note, further, that under the assumption that there is ‘money
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illusion’, the perceived price of wheat affects the land allocation in a similar way, but the 
elasticities are substantially smaller: a rise in the perceived price of wheat reduces the amount of 
land under wheat by only 0.0066 to 0.0086 per cent and increases the area under gram by only
0.0167 to 0.0184 per cent.
The effect o f the perceived price of gram
Regardless whether the Punjabi farmers suffer from ‘money illusion’ or not, the effect 
of the perceived price of gram on the amount of land allocated to gram is negative and 
significant whereas on the area under wheat it is not significantly different from zero for the 
entire range of p. Note, however, that the elasticity of gram-land with respect to this factor is 
substantial only under the assumption that there is no ‘money illusion’ and, in general, declines 
as P goes to 1 and ranges between -0.4971 and -3.0063. Under the assumption of ‘money 
illusion’ the gram-land’s elasticity also declines with P but is substantially smaller, in absolute 
terms, and ranges between -0.0042 and -0.0339. Similar to the previous case, these results 
indicate that the Punjabi farmers are risk averse and are exposed to considerable costs of risk 
bearing stemming from the uncertainty involved in growing gram even though these costs are 
moderated by the negative covariance between the per hectare yields of wheat and gram.
The effect o f the perceived average yield o f rice
As expected by the conceptual model, the estimated effect of the perceived average yield 
of rice on land under rice, with and without ‘money illusion’, is found to be significantly 
positive for the entire range of P, but the corresponding elasticity is small and slightly increases 
with P from 0.0623 to 0.1427 if the Punjabi farmers do not suffer from ‘money illusion’ and 
from 0.0717 to 0.0847 if they suffer from ‘money illusion’. Correspondingly, in the case that 
the Punjabi farmers do not suffer from ‘money illusion’, the estimated effect of the perceived 
average yield of rice on land under maize is significantly negative for the entire range of P, and 
the elasticity is small and only slightly increases, in absolute terms, from -0.0323 to -0.0367 as 
P rises. Under the alternative assumption that the Punjabi farmers suffer from ‘money illusion’, 
the estimated effect of the perceived average yield of rice on the amount of land under maize is
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negative and statistically significant only for 0.1 < (3 < 0.3 and the associated elasticity is small 
and declines, in absolute terms, from -0.0422 to -0.0322 as (3 increases.
The effect o f the perceived average yield o f maize
As stipulated in the conceptual framework, the estimated effect of the perceived average 
yield of maize on land under rice, with and without ‘money illusion’, is negative and 
statistically significant for the entire range of p. However, the corresponding elasticity is small. 
In the case where the Punjabi fanners do not suffer from ‘money illusion’, it initially increases, 
in absolute terms, with (3 and reaches a peak of -0.0686 when (3 is equal to 0.6 and thereafter 
declines gradually, in absolute terms, to -0.0211 as (3 goes to 1. In the case where farmers 
suffer from ‘money illusion’, the rice-land’s elasticity generally increases, in absolute terms, 
with [3 from -0.0474 to -0.0662. Correspondingly, the estimated effect of the perceived average 
yield of maize on land under maize, with and without ‘money illusion’, is positive and 
statistically significant, but the corresponding elasticity is small. If the Punjabi farmers do not 
suffer from ‘money illusion’, the maize-land’s elasticity with respect to this factor rises, in 
general, with j3 from 0.0253 to 0.0500; and if they suffer from ‘money illusion’, it similarly 
rises slightly more with P from 0.0263 to 0.0847.
The effect o f the perceived average yield o f wheat
The estimated effect of the perceived average yield of wheat on land under wheat is as 
expected positive and statistically significant for the entire range of p regardless of whether or 
not the Punjabi farmers suffer from money illusion. However, the wheat-land’s elasticity is 
small and slightly increases with P: from 0.0269 to 0.0752, if the money illusion assumption 
prevails, and from 0.0257 to 0.0796, if there is no money illusion. Correspondingly, the 
estimation results indicate that although the number of hectares allocated to gram declines 
significantly with the perceived average yield of wheat, the gram-land’s elasticity with respect 
to this factor is small and rises with P, in absolute terms, from -0.0284 to -0.1430, if there was 
‘money illusion’, and from -0.0382 to -0.1762, if there there was no ‘money illusion’.
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The effect o f the perceived average yield of gram
Under both the ‘money illusion’ assumption and the ‘no-money illusion’ assumption, 
the estimated effects of the perceived average yield of gram on land allocation between wheat 
and gram are very similar. As expected, the perceived average yield of gram reduces the amount 
of land under wheat. This result is statistically significant for the entire range of (3, but the 
associated elasticity is small and ranges, in both cases, between -0.0025 to -0.0034. The effect 
of this factor on the amount of land allocated to gram is positive but statistically insignificant.
The effect o f the perceived yield-variance o f rice
As expected in the conceptual analysis, the estimated effect of the yield variance of rice 
on the amount of land allocated to rice, with and without ‘money illusion’ , is negative for 
almost the entire range of P, but statistically insignificant. The effect of this factor on the 
amount of land allocated to maize, with and without ‘money illusion’, is positive. If ‘money 
illusion’ prevailed, it is statistically significant for the entire range of (3, whereas if there was no 
‘money illusion’ it is statistically significant only for high values of (3 (i.e., (3 > 0.7). In both 
cases, the maize-land’s elasticity with respect to the rice’s yield-variance is small and rises with 
p from 0.0001 to 0.0023.
The effect o f the perceived yield-variance o f maize
Contrary to the conceptual analysis, the estimated effect of the maize’s yield-variance on 
the amount of land under maize, with and without ‘money illusion’, is positive and statistically 
significant for the entire range of p. However, the maize-land’s elasticity with respect to the 
maize’s yield-variance is small in both cases and ranges between 0.0011 and 0.0018. The 
estimated effect of the maize’s yield-variance on the amount of land under rice, with and 
without ‘money illusion’, is positive and statistically significant for the entire range of p and 
indicates, probably, the Punjabi farmers desire to spread risk in order to reduce the total costs 
of risk bearing as suggested in proposition 3. However, the rice-land’s elasticity with respect to 
the maize’s yield-variance is small and ranges in both cases between 0.0013 to 0.0017.
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The effect o f the perceived yield-variance o f wheat
The estimated effect of the wheat’s yield-variance on the area under wheat, with and 
without ‘money illusion’, is positive and statistically significant for almost the entire range of p. 
However, the wheat-land’s elasticity with respect to wheat’s yield-variance is small in both 
cases and ranges between 0.0007 and 0.0014. Note that, similar to the aforementioned 
estimated effect of maize’s yield-variance on area under maize, this finding is contrary to the 
properties of the mean-variance model. Moreover, the estimated effect of the wheat’s yield- 
variance on the area under gram, with and without ‘money illusion’, is negative and statistically 
significant for almost the entire range of (3. However, the gram-land’s elasticity with respect to 
the wheat’s yield-variance is small and ranges in both cases between -0.0013 to -0.0041.
The effect o f the perceived yield-variance o f gram
As expected by the conceptual analysis, the effect of the gram’s yield-variance on the 
amount of land under gram, with and without ‘money illusion’, is negative and statistically 
significant for almost the entire range of (3, excluding the limiting case of naive expectations. 
However, the gram-land’s elasticity with respect to gram’s yield-variance is very small and 
ranges between -0.00001 to -0.000033. The effect of this factor on the amount of land under 
wheat is positive but statistically significant only for (3 equal to 0.5, if there is ‘no-money 
illusion’, and for 0.1 < (3 < 0.4, if the Punjabi farmers suffer from ‘money illusion’. Moreover, 
the corresponding elasticity is very small and equal to 0.00001.
The effect o f the perceived rice-maize’s yield-covariance
The sample covariance between the per hectare yields of rice and maize is negative, and 
therefore suggests that these crops have different responses to uncontrolled growing 
conditions, or that the Punjabi farmers have an ability and/or incentive to control the growing 
conditions of one of these crops better than the other. While the per hectare yield- covariance, 
with and without ‘money illusion’, has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
amount of land under rice for the entire range of P, it has negative, though statistically 
insignificant, effect on the amount of land under maize. In recalling that the elasticity of rice-
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land with respect to per hectare yield-covariance is very small (0.0005), farmers in the Punjab 
will slightly increase the amount of land under rice once the responses of rice and maize to 
uncontrolled growing conditions become more similar (for example, through the introduction of 
new hybrids and/or improved growing technology).
The effect o f the perceived wheat-gram’s yield-covariance
The sample covariance between the per hectare yields of wheat and gram is negative, 
and therefore suggests that these crops have different responses to uncontrolled growing 
conditions, or that the Punjab farmers have an ability and/or incentive to control the growing 
conditions of one of these crops than the other. The per hectare yield-covariance, with and 
without ‘money illusion’, has a positive effect on the amount of land under gram but which is 
statistically significant only for 0.3 < (3 < 0.5. Note, however, that the corresponding elasticity 
is very small and equal to 0.0001. Moreover, the effect of per hectare yield-covariance on the 
amount of land under wheat is negative but statistically insignificant. That is, as the responses 
of wheat and gram to uncontrolled growing conditions become more similar, farmers in the 
Punjab will only slightly increase the amount of land under gram.
The effect o f the perceived price o f fertilisers
The estimation results indicate that a rise in the perceived price of fertilisers increases the 
amount of land under both wheat and gram, possibly at the expense of other winter crops 
excluded from the analysis and which utilise fertilisers more intensively. The wheat-land’s 
elasticity and the gram-land’s elasticity are substantial if the Punjabi farmers do not suffer from 
‘money illusion’. Moreover, as P declines, these land elasticities increase from 0.7885 to 
8.7223, in the case of wheat, and from 0.8172 to 20.0721, in the case of gram. However, if 
the Punjabi farmers suffer from ‘money illusion’, the land elasticities of wheat and gram with 
respect to the perceived price of fertilisers are substantially smaller: between 0.0087 to 0.0856 
and 0.0091 to 0.2074 in the cases of wheat and gram, respectively.
With regard to the summer crops, rice and maize, the estimation results indicate that a 
rise in the perceived fertilisers’ price reduces the amount of land under rice and increases that
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under maize. This effect is more substantial if the Punjabi farmers gave relatively low weights 
to recent observations in the formation of their expectations about input and output prices (i.e., 
small value of (3) and did not suffer from ‘money illusion. In this case, the land-elasticity with 
respect to the perceived price of fertilisers can reach -10.811 and 4.5429 for rice and maize, 
respectively. However, these results are statistically insignificant at the five per cent level.
The effect o f the perceived price o f herbicides and pesticides
A rise in the perceived price of herbicides and pesticides increases the amount of land 
under rice and decreases that under maize. This effect is more substantial if the Punjabi farmers 
did not suffer from ‘money illusion’ and assigned relatively low weights to recent observations 
in the formation of their price expectations. For example, in the extreme case where (3 is equal 
to 0.1, the land’s elasticities are 14.8688 per cent and -13.8393 per cent for rice and maize, 
respectively.
With regard to the winter crops, a rise in the perceived price of herbicides and pesticides 
does not significantly affect the amount of land under wheat but reduces significantly the 
amount of land under gram, in particular, if the Punjabi farmers did not suffer from ‘money 
illusion’. In this case, the gram-land,s elasticity is substantial and increases, in absolute terms, 
from -2.4259 to -15.2895 as (3 declines.
5 SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper analysed the responses of farmers’ decision on land allocation between the 
major winter cereals wheat and gram and the summer cereals rice and maize in India’s most 
agriculturally advanced state—Punjab. A mean-variance model of optimal land-allocation was 
developed and estimated with panel data on seven districts of Punjab for the green revolution 
period 1966-1986. The estimation of the derived land-allocation equations considered a wide 
range of assumptions about the input and output price-expectation’s mechanism as well as the 
issue of ‘money illusion’.
In general, the direction of the estimated effects are robust with respect to variation in 
the price-expectation’s coefficient, P; but in many cases, the computed elasticities vary
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monotonically and significantly with this coefficient. The estimation results reveal that the costs 
of risk bearing play a significant, and in some cases dominant, role in determining the effects of 
the perceived prices of the various crops on land allocation, leading in many cases to results 
which differ in both direction and magnitude from those obtained in previous studies on land 
allocation in India, and which could not be explained if the Punjabi farmers have not been risk 
averse. It is also evident that the land allocation’s elasticities with respect to the perceived 
cereals’ prices are very sensitive to the issue of ‘money illusion’. The estimation results also 
indicate that the effects of the perceived per hectare average yields on land allocation in Punjab 
are statistically significant and generally compatible with the hypotheses generated by the 
conceptual analysis. However, the land-allocation’s elasticities with respect to these factors are 
small. It is important to note that while the estimates of the effects of the yield-variances on land 
allocation are compatible with the conceptual analysis in the case of the summer crops rice and 
maize, they are contrary to the properties of the conceptual framework in the case of the winter 
crops wheat and gram. In each of these cases, the computed land elasticities with respect to 
yield-variances, with and without ‘money illusion’, are very small. The estimation results 
associated with the yield-covariances indicated that the effect of a greater similarity in the 
responses of the winter and summer cereals to uncontrolled growing conditions will not 
substantially alter the land allocation in Punjab. Finally, the estimation results highlight the 
substantial effect of the prices of fertilisers, herbicides and pesticides on the allocation of land in 
Punjab. The effects of these input prices were found to be very sensitive to the existence, or 
nonexistence, of ‘money illusion’, and are substantial in the case where the Punjabi farmers 
gave low weights to recent observations in the formation of their expectations about input and 
output prices.
Policy makers’ reliance on food-grain output prices in recent decades as a major 
instrument, in our judgement, has been misplaced. The estimated price elasticities for earlier 
years with specific assumptions about expectations in current prices are vastly different from 
those reported in earlier studies. As such, it is desirable for the policy makers to be aware of the 
interactions involved and the range of estimated elasticities. Trends, growth and variations in 
yield per hectare seem to be more important in land-allocation decisions than price
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considerations only. Research effort in some cereals only and neglect of others (e.g., wheat but 
not gram) might inappropriately affect area allocation and the farming system. Research and 
development efforts need to be focused on the farming system as a whole. Input prices, like 
those of fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, are important factors in farmers’ decision. In 
many situations, they are even more important policy instruments than the output prices. Recent 
policy changes dealing with removal of fertilisers subsidies should be attempted with a high 
degree of caution.
NOTES
1. See Schultz (1975), Chaudhri (1979) and Jamison and Lau (1982) for theory and 
evidence.
2. See Chaudhri and Dasgupta (1985), Chapter III.
3. For a review of studies on India and Punjab, see Gulati (1985, 1987).
4. See Hammond (1974) for a discussion of the generality of this framework.
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APPENDIX A: MATHEMATICAL NOTES
When only two crops are involved and the land constraint is binding, the objective 
function can be expressed as:
Equation 15 is obtained from A.2 and the inequality 16 from A.3.
For tractability, the proofs of the propositions summarising the properties of the interior 
solution to the land allocation problem use the symbols N and D to denote the numerator and 
denominator on the r.h.s. of equation 15, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1: The perceived own price effect is found by differentiating equation 
15 with respect to P̂ p
max { E [u(y) ] = [P^ yi - ci(we)]Li + [P^ y2 - c2(We)] (1 - Li) 
Li
-0.5R [ p f  o \  h j  + p f  ° 2  (! - L l)2 + 2pl p 2 Ll (1 - Li) a i2] } . (A.l)
The first-order condition for maximum expected utility is:
8Ef f ° ] = [P? yi - cl(we)] - [P| y2 - c2(we)] - R[(pf o\ - 2P® P | a n  + P f  4 K  
- p f  a  ̂+ Pe1P |a i2]= 0 (A.2)
and the second-order condition for maximum is
(A.3)
9L (yi - RPe! a n )  D - 2R(Pe1 - P e2 a !2)N
D2
y i - RPe2 o n  - 2R(Pe! o ]  - Pe2 a !2)L
D
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y i - R[Pe! a \  - (2L j - 1) Pe2o 12]
--------------------- D--------------------- • (A.4)
By virtue of the second-order condition 16, D > 0 and hence
3L*
§ 0 as yi |  R[P® o? - (2L* -1) P | o !2]. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: By differentiating equation 15 with respect to Pf we obtain 
d l * [-y2 + 2R(Pe2 G 2  - P \ Oi2)]D - 2R(Pe2 a ]  - P° 0 1 2 ) N
-y2 + 2R(Pe2 a | - P e1 a i 2) ( l - L * 1)
D
and since D > 0
dh*
(A.5)
—^ 1 0 as 2R(P| o f - P\ 012) (1 - L*) - y2 1 0. QED
iCap'2
Proof of Proposition 3: By differentiating equation 15 with respect to o 2 we obtain 
3L.  R p f  D - R Pe22 N
= &2






—  1 0 as [P2 y2 - c2(we)] + R(P<p - P® P | a 12) |  [P  ̂ yi - ci (v^)]. QED
002
Proof of Proposition 4: By differentiating equation 15 with respect to G12 we obtain 
RP® P |  (D - 2N)
D2
R(Pj P 2 [(Pei y i - Cl (we)) - ( P | y2 - c2 (we)) + R ( P |2 <52 - P \ 2 of)])
_ _
(A.7)




APPENDIX B: ESTIMATION RESULTS’ TABLES
T able B .l  Pooled cross section-tim e series estim ates o f  land allocation in sum m ers between rice and m aize w ithout m oney illusion  
for Punjab 1966-1986
Rice Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and e lastic ities





























































































































































Table B .l (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
(3=0.1 (3=0.2 (3=0.3 (3=0.4 (3=0.5 (3=0.6 (3=0.7 (3=0.8 (3=0.9 (3=1.0




(2.9438) (2.7310) (2.7263) (2.7473) (2.7781) (2.8237) (2.8834) (2.9417) (2.9917) (3.086)
0.0015 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0017 0.0017





















-50400 -18614 -9429.1 -6255 -4978.4 -4487.6 -4454.1 -4809.1 -5377.4 -5594.9
e
W1 (1.5880) (1.0583) (0.7661) (0.6699) (0.6726) (0.7418) (0.8736) (1.087) (1.389) (-1.633)
-10.877 -4.0171 -2.0349 -1.3499 -1.0744 -0.9685 -0.9612 -1.0378 -1.1605 -1.2074
56050 24900 14080 9193.2 6254.4 4203.5 2744.2 1677.4 856.21 437.53
e
w2 (2.3754) (1.6965) (1.2836) (1.0645) (0.8919) (0.7208)
(0.5505) (0.3809) (0.2159) (0.121)





















BUSE R2 0.2673 0.2767 0.2820 0.2865 0.2907 0.2933 0.2931 0.2933 0.3140 0.354
FPE 0.5541 0.5508 0.5461 0.5401 0.5335 0.5271 0.5220 0.5205 0.5256 0.5323
Table B .l (continued)
M aize Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
(3=0.1 ji= 0 .2 (3=0-3 (3=0.4 |3=0.5 (3=0.6 3 = 0 .7 (3=0.8 (3=0.9 (3=1.0
-7514.8 -3867 -5725.7 -9371 -12286 -13302 -12513 -10742 -8741.2 -6946.1
Penee (0.4195) (0.2308)
(0.3804) (0.702) (1.0465) (1.3015) (1.4137) (1.3944) (1.2852) (1.1359)
-1.0921 -0.562 -0.8321 -1.3619 -1.7855 -1.9332 -1.8185 -1.5611 -1.2704 -1.0095
9302.2 6373.4 7026.6 7228.1 7455.4 7593.9 7280.9 6517.5 5560.9 4712.3
Pe • maize (0.2811)
(0.3784) (0.6116) (0.8344) (1.0863) (1.3605) (1.5798) (1.6893) (1.6914) (1.6436)
1.4964 1.0252 1.1303 1.1627 1.1993 1.2216 1.1712 1.0484 0.8945 0.758










































0.01 0.0083 0.0084 0.0093 0.0106 0.0116 0.0124 0.0132 0.0145 0.0163
2 
O .nee
(1.4354) (1.1498) (1.1241) (1.2186) (1.3657) (1.4979) (1.6091) (1.7429) (1.9353) (2.1932)
0.0014 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0015 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 0.002 0.0023
0.0179 0.0254 0.0282 0.0283 0.0273 0.0262 0.0255 0.0244 0.0224 0.019
2
a maize
(2.3918) (3.4951) (3.8715) (3.8166) (3.6016) (3.4036) (3.2559) (3.0718) (2.7577) (2.288)
0.0011 0.0016 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0014 0.0012
Table B .l (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities




















































































































BUSE R2 0.3147 0.3266 0.3173 0.3026 0.2861 0.2714 0.2573 0.2388 0.2140 0.1872
FPE 0.5649 0.5630 0.5570 0.5524 0.5490 0.5471 0.5476 0.5502 0.5538 0.5573
Table 3 .2  Pooled cross section-time series estimates of land allocation in summers between rice and maize with money illusion
for Punjab 1966-1986
Rice Land Regression Equation
E xp lan atory
variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i P = 0 .2 P = 0 .3 P = 0 .4 P = 0 .5 P = 0 .6 P = 0 .7 P=©.8 P = 0 .9 p = 1 .0
229.35 316.60 297.27 248.55 201.33 164.94 139.61 123.09 112.91 106.05
Penee (1.2496) (2.1458) (2.5156) (2.5634) (2.4897) (2.4142) (2.3823) (2.3987) (2.4467) (2.4954)
0.0348 0.048 0.0451 0.0377 0.0305 0.025 0.0212 0.0187 0.0171 0.0161
315.50 56.026 14.643 16.430 23.139 26.942 28.132 27.705 25.834 22.812
P e • maize (0.9072) (0.3517) (0.1455) (0.2269) (0.4155) (0.6028) (0.7579) (0.8684) (0.9044) (0.8607)
0.0538 0.0096 0.0025 0.0028 0.0039 0.0046 0.0048 0.0047 0.0044 0.0039





















-15.919 -15.418 -15.766 -17.084 -18.78 -20.281 -21.281 -21.556 -20.636 -18.78




















-0.01102 -0.0161 -0.0162 -0.0138 -0.0104 -0.0068 -0.0032 -0.00006 0.0023 0.0040
o 2nee (0.9119) (1.3181) (1.3064) (1.1007) (0.8315) (0.5448) (0.2618) (0.0053) (0.1945) (0.3300)
-0.001 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0003 -5E-6 0.0002 0.0004
0.0330 0.0292 0.0290 0.0299 0.0311 0.0321 0.0328 0.0331 0.0332 0.03313
a 2 •maize (3.0454) (2.7825) (2.7585) (2.7825) (2.8188) (2.8529) (2.8726) (2.8734) (2.8525) (2.8116)
0.0014 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014
Table B.2 (continued)
Rice Land Regression Equation
E xp lan atory
variab le Estim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities




















































































































BUSE R 2 0.3569 0.3979 0.4201 0.4390 0.4492 0.4461 0.4345 0.4222 0.4139 0.4114
FPE 0.5628 0.5636 0.5625 0.5606 0.5576 0.5520 0.5475 0.5422 0.5382 0.5360
Table B.2 (continued)
M aize Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
-48.547 52.606 76.664 71.412 58.599 44.434 31.490 19.594 8.0042 -3.7785
P enee (0.3981) (0.4778) (0.8447) (0.9441) (0.9211) (0.8276) (0.6962) (0.5127) (0.2444) (0.1307)
-0.0108 0.0117 0.0171 0.0159 0.0131 0.0099 0.007 0.0044 0.0018 -0.0008
160.35 107.45 93.326 75.387 64.945 61.198 58.763 54.916 48.903 40.615
P e • maize (0.6768) (0.9021) (1.1739) (1.2664) (1.3719) (1.5843) (1.8515) (2.0964) (2.2371) (2.1625)
0.0402 0.027 0.0234 0.0189 0.0163 0.0154 0.0147 0.0138 0.0123 0.0102










































0.0146 0.0117 0.0112 0.0119 0.0131 0.0142 0.0148 0.0150 0.0152 0.0155
o 2.nee (2.0208) (1.5403) (1.4230) (1.4816) (1.6167) (1.7372) (1.8106) (1.8695) (1.9512) (2.051)
0.002 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 0.002 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0022
0.0174 0.0241 0.0266 0.0257 0.0233 0.0213 0.0208 0.02156 0.0218 0.0196
o 2maize (2.2554) (3.2381) (3.6097) (3.427) (3.0071) (2.6901) (2.6362) (2.7698) (2.8466) (2.5374)
0.0011 0.0015 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0013
Table B.2 (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i P = 0 .2 (3=0.3 P = 0 .4 (3=0.5 (3=0.6 [3=0.7 (3=0.g (3=0.9 (3=1.0

















































































































BUSE R2 0.3240 0.3213 0.3277 0.3177 0.3009 0.2945 0.3054 0.3281 0.3501 0.3456
FPE 0.5688 0.5658 0.5584 0.5509 0.5437 0.5385 0.5364 0.5355 0.5360 0.5397
Table B.3 Pooled cross section-time series estimates of land allocation in winters between wheat and gram without money illusion
for Punjab 1966-86
W heat Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i P = 0 .2 (3=0.3 (3=0.4 [3=0.5 (3=0.6 P = 0 .7 P = 0 .8 P = 0.9 p = i .o
-13262 -18867 -22937 -24498 -25930 -20145 -15349 -10044 -5224.1 -1663.1
P ewheat (2.2426) (3.1758) (3.9252) (4.292) (3.9717) (3.73) (2.9210) (1.9258) (0.9796) (0.2974)
-0.6174 -0.8784 -1.0679 -1.1405 -1.2072 -0.9379 -0.7146 -0.4676 -0.2432 -0.0774
-807.93 714.11 290.88 51.179 -2088.5 -155.89 -155.75 -145.67 -200.00 -335.66
P egram (0.0764) (0.1128) (0.0631) (0.0146) (0.7028) (0.0714) (0.0878) (0.0978) (0.1530) (0.2787)
-0.0578 0.0511 0.0208 0.0037 -0.1495 -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0104 -0.0143 -0.0240
16.381 22.373 28.207 33.932 54.33 43.889 47.441 49.743 50.817 50.544









































0.0468 0.0382 0.0360 0.0365 -0.0379 0.0389 0.0404 0.04198 0.0440 0.04617
2
wheat (2.7332) (2.1575) (1.9615) (1.9387) (1.6230) (2.0495) (2.1422) (2.2302) (2.3174) (2.3785)
0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013
0.00038 0.00038 0.00037 0.00036 0.00036 0.00033 0.00031 0.00027 0.00022 0.00019
a 2gram (1.3423) (1.2905) (1.2526) (1.2597) (2.331) (1.2134) (1.1573) (1.0360) (0.8640) (0.7162)
0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 4.5E-6 3.9E-6
Table B.3 (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities




















































































































BUSE R2 0.2293 0.3287 0.3890 0.4326 0.4411 0.4733 0.4812 0.4912 0.5071 0.5230
FPE 0.5461 0.5391 0.5332 0.5293 0.4978 0.5281 0.5306 0.5333 0.5366 0.5406
Table B.3 (continued)
Gram Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variable E stim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities































































































































variab le E stim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities



















































































































































































BUSE R2 0.2466 0.4065 0.5518 0.5896 0.5246 0.5290 0.4891 0.4560 0.4334 0.4190
FPE 0.5255 0.5277 0.5369 0.5397 0.5292 0.5351 0.5314 0.5263 0.5197 0.5136
Table B.4 Pooled cross section-time series estimates o f land allocation between wheat and gram with money illusion
for Punjab 1966-1986
W heat Lane! Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i (3=0.2 (3=0.3 (3=0.4 (3=0.5 (3=0.6 (3=0.7 (3=0.8 (3=0.9 (3=1.0
-124.79 -119.66 -115.17 -109.45 -96.244 -76.005 -53.491 -35.021 -24.722 -20.400
Pewheat (2.1195) (2.0185) (1.9781) (1.9127) (1.7284) (1.4298) (1.0679) (0.7290) (0.5132) (0.4124)
-0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0079 -0.0075 -0.0066 -0.0052 -0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0017 -0.0014
-97.507 -31.897 -12.457 -4.0225 0.6616 2.4421 1.2665 -2.2161 -5.8505 -7.8319
Pegram (1.1622) (0.6374) (0.3446) (0.1474) (0.0312) (0.1462) (0.0947) (0.1984) (0.5835) (0.8240)
-0.0121 -0.004 -0.0016 -0.0005 0.00008 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0010










































0.0396 0.02737 0.0235 0.0236 0.0249 0.0264 0.0286 0.0327 0.0390 0.0442
2
wheat (2.269) (1.5638) (1.3402) (1.3268) (0.3860) (1.4786) (1.614) (1.8336) (2.1302) (2.3277)
0.0011 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013
0.00052 0.0005 0.00047 0.00044 0.00038 0.00033 0.00028 0.00025 0.00023 0.00023
a 2gram (1.8371) (1.7974) (1.6723) (1.5712) (1.4301) (1.2537) (1.1044) (1.0039) (0.9402) (0.9101)
0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 4.7E-6 4.7E-6
Table B.4 (contiaaied)
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elastic ities


















































































































BUSE R2 0.2213 0.3320 0.3973 0.4440 0.4817 0.5083 0.5300 0.5468 0.5509 0.5469
FPE 0.5393 0.5309 0.568 0.5234 0.5211 0.5205 0.5215 0.5223 0.5223 0.5227
Table B.4 (continued)
Gram Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
27.379 30.187 28.428 19.802 10.185 3.0697 -1.5011 -4.0346 -5.3223 -6.2126
P ewheat (2.1026) (1.9627) (1.6368) (1.1187) (0.5933) (0.1868) (0.0955) (0.2681) (0.3649) (0.4305)
0.0167 0.0184 0.0173 0.0121 0.0062 0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0038
-21.823 -29.310 -30.614 -25.865 -19.483 -14.212 -10.274 -7.3263 -5.1888 -3.7741
P egram (1.4824) (3.469) (4.4232) (4.2528) (3.7199) (3.2251) (2.7818) (2.3382) (1.895) (1.5119)
-0.0241 -0.0324 -0.0339 -0.0286 -0.0215 -0.0157 -0.0114 -0.0081 -0.0057 -0.0042
-2.0388 -3.9222 -5.5494 -6.7875 -7.8383 -8.8175 -9.6640 -10.209 -10.268 -9.7767









































-0.0123 -0.0109 -0.01037 -0.0101 -0.0105 -0.0111 -0.0118 -0.0128 -0.0139 -0.0148
°w h ea t (2.4824) (1.7086) (1.4938) (1.4247) (1.4996) (1.6284) (1.7852) (1.9807) (2.1986) (2.398)
-0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0028 -0.003 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0038
-0.00011 -0.00013 -0.00015 -0.00015 -0.00013 -0.00011 -0.00009 -0.000075 -0.000064 -0.00006
a 2gram (2.0712) (2.3165) (2.4447) (2.3469) (2.0396) (1.7406) (1.5111) (1.3347) (1.1824) (1.0514)
-0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
Table B.4 (continued)
E xp lan atory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elastic ities




















































































































BUSE R2 0.1913 0.2977 0.4525 0.5180 0.5177 0.4935 0.4629 0.4350 0.4159 0.4054
FPE 0.5186 0.5198 0.5269 0.5286 0.5266 0.5257 0.5250 0.5227 0.5838 0.5148
Table B.5 Seemingly unrelated regression equation estimates of land allocation between rice and maize without money illusion
for Punjab 1966-86
Rice Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i (3=0.2 P = 0 .3 P = 0.4 P = 0 .5 P = 0 .6 P = 0 .7 P = 0.8 P = 0 .9 p = o .io





















































































































































variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities



























































































R2 0.3481 0.4238 0.4614 0.4833 0.4981 0.5085 0.5160 0.5214 0.5245 0.5285
FPE 0.13E+9 0.21E+9 0.33E+9 0.48E+9 0.68E+9 0.90E+9 0.12E+10 0.20E+10 0.18E+10 0.22E+10
Table B.5 (continued)
M aize Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i 8 = 3 .2 P = 0.3 P = 0 .4 p=®.5 P = 0 .6 P = 0 .7 2 = 2 .8 p = e .9 p = i .o
DPR 2776.0 4953.7 6862.7 8197.5 9536.3 11685 14944 18952 23092 26897
(0.1286) (0.2050) (0.2580) (0.2917) (0.3332) (0.4103) (0.5326) (0.6868) (0.8495) (1.0018)
0.0480 0.0661 0.0833 0.0947 0.1068 0.1282 0.1616 0.2026 0.2447 0.2830
DPM 12123 -12975 -19841 -21620 -21419 -20539 -19578 -18.757 -18115 -17633
(0.2364) (0.4429) (0.8670) (1.0890) (1.1922) (1.2345) (1.2486) (1.2508) (01.2486) (1.2453)
0.1505 -0.1513 -0.2268 -0.2447 -0.2411 -0.2303 -0.2189 -0.2093 -0.2018 -0.1962
DAYR -5.8072 -6.0202 -5.6100 -5.1745 -5.1448 -5.6176 -6.4691 -7.4959 -8.5232 -9.4490
(1.3520) (1.3693) (1.2531) (1.1580) (1.1746) (1.3209) (1.5684) (1.8666) (2.1684) (2.4436)
-0.4262 -0.3235 -0.2676 -0.2316 -0.2214 -0.2353 -0.2658 -0.3034 -0.3410 -0.3745
DAYM 6.1368 8.1916 11.905 17.291 23.502 29.282 33.710 36.558 38.114 38.816
(1.8904) (2.3562) (3.0582) (3.9445) (4.8663) (5.6818) (6.3138) (6.7569) (7.0504) (7.2426)
0.3090 0.3134 0.4113 0.5662 0.7446 0.9071 1.0275 0.1007 1.1366 1.1486
DVYR 0.0167 0.0181 0.0230 0.0304 0.03858 0.0467 0.0536 0.0593 0.0640 0.0678
(1.3947) (1.2943) (1.3972) (1.6208) (1.8856) (2.1405) (2.3628) (2.5482) (2.6997) (2.8222)
0.0368 0.0315 0.0368 0.0465 0.0577 0.0683 0.0774 0.0848 0.0908 0.0955
DVYM 0.0117 0.0034 -0.0106 -0.0264 -0.0405 -0.0513 -0.0599 -0.0675 -0.0749 -0.0818
(1.0622) (0.2461) (0.7082) (1.5522) (2.1406) (2.4979) (2.7291) (2.9267) (3.1295) (3.3375)
0.0241 0.0057 -0.0168 -0.0407 -0.0610 -0.0763 -0.0882 -0.0987 -0.1087 -0.1182
DCOVRM 0.0050 0.0076 0.0073 0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0125 -0.0214 -0.0295 -0.0365 -0.0425
(0.2688) (0.3510) (0.2838) (0.1129) (0.1010) (0.3362) (0.5365) (0.7027) (0.8382) (0.9476)
0.0003 0.3510 0.0015 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0029 -0.0050 -0.0070 -0.0087 -0.0102
Table B.5 (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elastic ities



























































































R2 0.2176 0.2323 0.2546 0.2918 0.3386 0.3849 0.4237 0.4530 0.4739 0.4886
FPE 0.43E+8 0.56E+8 0.76E+8 0.10E+9 0.13E+9 0.16E+9 0.20E+9 0.23E+9 0.28E+9 0.33E+9
System R2 0.4079 0.4518 0.4898 0.5388 0.5945 0.6476 0.6917 0.7254 0.7499 0.7674
Chi-square 73.375 84.144 94.226 108.36 126.38 146.01 164.75 180.95 194.02 204.17
D.F.
Table B.6 Seemingly unrelated regression equation estimates of land allocation between rice and maise with money illusion
for Punjab 1966-86
Rice Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
(5=0-1 (3=0.2 (3=0.3 (3=0.4 P = 0 .5 (3=0.6 (3=0.7 (3=0.8 (3=0.9 p = o . io





















































































































































variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities

















































































R2 0.4171 0.5047 0.5472 0.5737 0.5936 0.6086 0.6187 0.6244 0.6270 0.6275
Table B.6 (continued)
M aize Land Regression Equation
E xp lan atory
variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elastic ities
p = o . i P = 0 .2 P = 0.3 P = 0 .4 P = 0 .5 P = 0 .6 P = 0 .7 P = 0 .8 P = 0 .9 p = i .o
FPE 0.12E+9 0.18E+9 0.28E+9 0.40E+9 0.55E+9 0.72E+9 0.92E+9 0.12E+10 0.14E+10 0.17E+10
































































































































variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elastic ities

























































































































R2 0.2340 .02481 0.2751 0.3218 0.3806 0.4395 0.4891 0.5290 0.5512 0.5674
FPE 0.43E+8 0.55E+8 0.74E+8 0.97E+9 0.12E+9 0.15E+9 0.17E+9 0.20E+9 0.24E+9 0.28E+9
System R2 0.4768 0.5324 0.5742 0.6214 0.6713 0.7167 0.7533 0.7804 0.7995 0.8126
Chi-Square 90.687 106.343 119.55 135.99 155.77 176.56 195.93 212.25 224.99 234.46
D.F.
Table B.7 Seemingly unrelated regression equation estimates of land allocation between wheat and gram without money illusion
for Punjab 1966-86
W heat Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variable Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
J3=0 .1 P = 0 .2 P = 0 .3 P = 0 .4 P = 0 .5 P = 0.6 P = 0 .7 P = 0 .8 P = 0 .9 p = i .o





















































































































































variab le Estim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities

















































































BUSE R2 0.1387 0.2123 0.3142 0.4061 0.6010 0.5239 0.5566 0.5787 0.5938 0.6042
FPE - - - - - 0.79E+9 0.98E+9 0.12E+10 0.15E+10 —
Table B.7 (continued)
Gram Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
(3=0-1 P = 0 .2 P = 0 .3 P = 0 .4 P = 0 .5 P = 0 .6 P = 0 .7 P = 0 .8 P = 0 .9 p = i .o
DPW 5287.8 4516.0 4246.8 4150.4 3613.1 3561.3 3086.2 2592.2 2137.1 1756.4
(1.0592) (0.9403) (0.8871) (0.8351) (0.6683) (0.6052) (0.4721) (0.3570) (0.2662) (0.1993)
-6.4457 0.5112 0.3287 0.2734 0.2175 0.2023 0.1684 0.1373 0.1106 0.0893
DPG -6641.1 -6439.5 -6355.0 -6280.4 -6158.8 -6088.3 -5970 -5865.7 95772.9 -5694.7
(0.8964) (1.7708) (2.5123) (3.0237) (3.2291) (3.3948) (3.3699) (3.2757) (3.1468) (3.0055)
-9.5152 -1.0194 -0.7343 -0.6393 -0.5851 -0.5531 -0.5271 -0.5066 0.4904 -0.4774
DAYW -6.2382 -5.5676 -5.4575 -5.7104 -2.5022 -6.2560 -6.3892 -6.4496 -6.4642 -6.4520
(2.2340) (1.9746) (1.9285) (2.0275) (0.6711) (2.2557) (2.3131) (2.3380) (2.3421) (2.3343)
-25.777 -2.0168 -1.3176 -1.1569 -0.4424 -1.0761 -1.0506 -1.0258 -1.0020 -0.9799
DAYG 2.0052 1.3741 0.9776 0.7024 -0.2912 0.3341 0.2241 0.1542 0.1155 0.0995
(1.1260) (0.8636) (0.6399) (0.4507) (.02230) (0.1905) (0.1200) (0.0781) (0.0558) (0.0462)
3.9895 0.2355 0.1107 0.0664 -0.0339 0.0267 0.0171 0.0114 0.0083 0.0070
DVYW -0.0109 -0.0112 -0.0119 -0.0132 -0.0043 -0.0169 -0.0190 -0.0209 -0.0227 -0.0241
(0.8361) (0.8403) (0.8394) (0.8547) (0.2346) (0.9209) (0.9589) (0.9944) (1.0249) (1.0497)
-0.9817 -0.0914 -0.0657 -0.0616 -0.0177 -0.0679 -0.0730 -0.0779 -0.0824 -0.0861
DVYG -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
(1.1461) (1.1009) (1.2108) (1.3856) (1.1179) (1.6905) (1.7934) (1.8671) (1.9181) (1.9520)
-0.8371 -0.0690 -0.0513 -0.0517 -0.0574 -0.0610 -0.0655 -0.0693 -0.0722 -0.0743
DCOVWG 0.0046 0.0045 0.0051 0.0062 0.0048 0.0089 0.0102 0.0112 0.0119 0.0124
(0.5333) (0.5194) (0.5580) (0.6254) (0.5805) (0.7643) (0.8131) (0.8457) (0.8646) (0.8733)
0.4326 0.0319 0.0221 0.0214 0.0145 0.0247 0.0264 0.0276 0.0284 0.0288
Table B.7 (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities

















































































R2 0.0636 0.0988 0.1613 0.2229 0.2484 0.3034 0.3255 0.3401 0.3497 0.3561
FPE - - - - - 0.82E+8 0.10E+9 0.13E+9 0.16E+9 —
System R2 0.1909 0.2743 0.4105 0.5428 0.7111 0.7149 0.7619 0.7931 0.8140 0.8280
Chi-square 29.653 44.88 73.987 109.56 173.84 175.70 200.93 220.60 235.46 246.44
D.F.
Table B.8 Seemingly unrelated regression equation estimates of land allocation between wheat and maize with money illusion
for Punjab 1966-86
W heat Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coefficien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
(3= o .i [3=0.2 (3=0.3 (3=0.4 (3=0.5 P = 0 .6 (3=0.7 (3=0.8 (3=0.9 p = o . io



















































































































































Table 3 .8  (continued)
E xplanatory
variab le E stim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities



























































































R2 0.1562 0.2324 0.3258 0.4127 0.4817 0.5319 0.5660 0.5884 0.6027 0.6118
FPE - - - - - 0.78E+9 0.96E+9 0.12E+10 0.14E+10 -
Table B.8 (continued)
W heat Land Regression Equation
E xplanatory
variab le Estim ated coeffic ien ts, t-ratios and elasticities
p = o . i P = 0 .2 P = 0.3 P = 0.4 P = 0 .5 P = 0 .6 P = 0 .7 P = 0 .8 P = 0.9 p = o . io























































































































































































































































R2 0.0561 0.0906 0.1539 0.2172 0.2668 0.3016 0.3251 0.3407 0.3511 0.3580
FPE - - - - - 0.82E+8 0.10E+9 0.13E+9 0.16E+9 -
System R2 0.1968 0.2851 0.4162 0.5442 0.6460 0.7182 0.7664 0.7979 0.8182 0.8312
Chi-square 30.683 47.04 75.343 110.0 145.39 177.30 203.61 223.86 238.67 249.05
D.F.
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